Excellence and its health technology assessment program. Nonetheless, with its creation comes a new decision problem, how to best allocate resources among cancer drugs. Objectives: Our objective was to estimate CDF's willingness and ability to pay for cancer drugs, providing guidance regarding where CDF funds are best spent, and determining the number of NHS quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) displaced through the existence of the fund. Methods: Using CDF utilization figures, cost-per-QALY, and treatment episode costs from National Institute for Health and Care Excellence health technology assessment reports, the league-table approach was applied to determine appropriate cost-effectiveness thresholds to inform the CDF's decision making. Results: The CDF exhibits a willingness-to-pay value of £223,627 per QALY, with 74% and 33% of expenditure for drugs with incremental cost-effectiveness ratios of more than £50,000 and more than £90,000, respectively. During 2013-2014, CDF expenditure generated 4,677 QALYs, compared with a potential 13,485 if the same funds were used as part of routine NHS commissioning, displacing 8,808 QALYs. By ring fencing 10%, 25%, and 50% of the CDF budget for the provision of unevaluated drugs, cost-effectiveness thresholds of £149,000, £111,400, and £68,600 were calculated, respectively. Conclusions: Adopting the proposed framework for CDF prioritization would result in disinvestment from a number of highly cost-ineffective drugs applicable for CDF reimbursement. The present lack of a formal economic evaluation not only results in net health losses but also compromises a founding principle of the NHS, that of "equal access for equal need."
Introduction
National Health Service (NHS) England's Cancer Drugs Fund (CDF) has been the subject of controversy since its inception, with many critics arguing that it creates a "backdoor" to the NHS, which circumvents National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) and its health technology assessment (HTA) program [1] [2] [3] [4] , imposing opportunity costs in terms of population health. Although the debate surrounding the existence of the fund has been lively, to date, very little attention has been paid to resource allocation within the fund.
NICE applies a universal decision rule in which the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of an intervention must, at least in theory, be below a predefined cost-effectiveness threshold in order to be considered a good use of scarce NHS resources. The exact value this threshold should take has been the subject of much debate, with arguments for higher [5] [6] [7] , lower [8, 9] , varying [10] , and flexible [11] thresholds throughout the literature. Of particular relevance to the CDF is the move away from NICE's default position that "a QALY is a QALY is a QALY," the emergence of "value-based assessment," and the growing support for reforming HTA to allow for the inclusion of "wider health benefits." These include the continuing debate around the "super-QALY" [12] [13] [14] , disease severity [15] [16] [17] [18] , and "end-of-life" weightings [19] [20] [21] , all of which are of significant relevance to the CDF.
However, perhaps the greatest barrier to such reform is not ideological or philosophical but technical. Although we are aware that funding one intervention necessitates imposing opportunity costs on others, we cannot be certain where these opportunity costs are borne. Comparing "known" and "unknown" means we cannot rationally attach an "equity weight" to an intervention under evaluation, unless we are able to identify and apply the correct weight to the unknown bearer of the opportunity cost and its corresponding patient group.
Although the wider NHS decision problem encounters efficiency-limiting information constraints [22] and issues surrounding disinvestment [23, 24] , the CDF does not. Because the CDF is exclusively meant for the funding of drugs and exclusively for the therapeutic area of cancer, the technical problem of searching for an accurate cost-effectiveness threshold becomes much simpler. In contrast to the NHS budget, in which opportunity costs are borne somewhere within a vast array of interventions across numerous therapeutic areas, we need only consider a much narrower range of health technologies, 74 at the time of writing, making the adoption and disinvestment of cancer drugs and services an issue of mathematical programming. Moreover, we need not concern ourselves with whether a cancer quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) ought to be valued more highly than a non-cancer QALY because all QALYs are accrued to cancer patients.
Despite the increased simplicity of cancer-specific threshold determination, it should be noted that the CDF's purpose implies two potentially competing objectives, making this process more challenging. The first is to offer an extended willingness to pay for cancer drugs beyond that of the NICE cost-effectiveness threshold. The second, similar to the European Medicines Agency's "adaptive pathways approach" [25] , is to speed up and increase access to cancer drugs that are yet to be assessed by NICE, currently under evaluation, or have had their assessments suspended or terminated, henceforth referred to as "unevaluated" treatment indications. Because the relative importance of these two CDF objectives has not been made explicit, any threshold necessarily becomes a function of how resources are to be allocated between the two, and can only apply to the former case, in which cost-effectiveness is known. Given that we do not know the precise objective function of the CDF, but do know the likely arguments within, in an attempt to formalize this process we propose a series of funding splits for the provision of known (NICE evaluated) and unknown (unevaluated) cancer drugs. Using historical CDF utilization data and NICE HTA and evidence review group (ERG) reports, this article determines each drug's impact on CDF's ability to pay for drugs and the subsequent potential for QALY generation, calculating corresponding candidate thresholds for treatments of known cost-effectiveness for each of these funding splits.
Methods
An analysis was undertaken to identify the cost-effectiveness and affordability of all treatments currently subject to reimbursement under the CDF, enabling the estimation of a range of suitable cost-effectiveness thresholds that may be used to inform CDF decision making, dependent on a range of potential funding allocations between evaluated (known) and unevaluated (unknown) treatment indications.
Data Sources and Extraction
We conducted a search of the NHS UK Cancer Drugs Fund Web site [26] to reveal all drugs subject to reimbursement under the most recent edition of the "CDF-approved list" at the time of writing. Because the treatment duration, clinical effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness of these drugs differ with respect to the form of cancer they are indicated to treat, every therapeutic indication for each of these drugs was identified. Following the identification of all relevant treatment options reimbursed by the CDF, a literature search was conducted with the sole purpose of identifying evidence concerning cost-effectiveness and drug acquisition costs. For the purpose of data collection and synthesis, no systematic search criteria or date restrictions were applied. The selective literature search was initially confined to the NICE database, to limit our results to those solely from an NHS perspective.
For each intervention, where available, full copies were obtained of the NICE technology appraisal resulting in the initial rejection or "optimized" recommendation for funding under routine NHS care. Data were extracted concerning total drug acquisition costs per indication and the estimated ICERs versus the next best standard of care, expressed in terms of the incremental cost per QALY. Because NICE HTA reports often contain multiple estimates of ICERs, contingent on numerous assumptions and conditions being met, the ICERs used were those identified as "most plausible" by the ERGs. Furthermore, because the remit of the CDF only permits the reimbursement of "drugs," and not the associated nursing and chemotherapeutic costs, every effort was made to ensure that the costs reported were in fact those solely associated with drug acquisition.
The expected utilization of each CDF intervention was obtained from historical CDF audit reports [26] . For indications for which NICE technology assessments were not available, this information was obtained using a range of resources including the NICE Web site, ERG reports, notices of HTA suspension and/or termination, and final appraisal determinations. If data were still unavailable, either due to HTA suspension and/or termination or simply having not yet undergone NICE HTA, these treatment indications were labeled as unevaluated due to being in use but having ultimately unknown cost-effectiveness or budget impact. In cases in which evidence obtained from NICE was incomplete, that is, information were available concerning the estimated cost per QALY but not the estimated cost per treatment episode, these were estimated using recommended dosing regimens contained within the HTA. If this information were also not available, treatment costs were sourced from the literature, converted to pounds sterling, and inflated to represent their net present value as appropriate.
Threshold Search: League- Table Approach This model makes use of the league-table search approach to threshold determination and applies it to the CDF. First proposed by Gafni and Birch [27, 28] , and the subject of much debate within the health economics literature [9, 29] , the league-table approach is a well-validated method for cost-effectiveness threshold elicitation, both in theory and in practice. Although excessive informational requirements render this approach infeasible for informing NHS-level questions of resource allocation [23, 24, 29] , this approach has been successfully applied to more modest NHS decision problems, including the estimation of "local" costeffectiveness thresholds at the primary care trust level [24] . As such, given the highly bounded nature of our hypothesis, a resource allocation problem considering just 74 treatment options within a single therapeutic area, we deemed this method to be the most accurate, flexible, and practical means of determining a CDF-specific threshold to inform future resource allocation. Under this approach, interventions are ranked in order of decreasing cost-effectiveness (increasing ICERs), expressed in terms of the cost per QALY gained, and adopted sequentially until the budget is exhausted. As presented in Table 1 , adapted from Appleby et al. [24] , the relevant threshold theoretically lies between indications X and Y, the point between the ICER of the last (least cost-effective) or marginal intervention funded (CDF indication X) and that of most cost-effective service not currently funded (CDF indication Y). To adopt interventions beyond this threshold (e.g., CDF intervention N) necessitates disinvestment from others of greater cost-effectiveness that produce greater health gains for every pound spent, resulting in an unambiguous loss in population health. In the event that the CDF budget exceeded the costs of satisfying demand for every treatment indication, the benchmark interventions approach [30] was applied to estimate the threshold on the basis of the maximum willingness to pay demonstrated when funding previous CDF interventions.
Scenario Analyses: Range of Candidate Thresholds
Because there are no existing data regarding the budget impact of unevaluated drugs, it is unclear how the purchase of such drugs will affect the existing budget for drugs of known cost-effectiveness and budget impact, and ultimately the affordability of these evaluated drugs. As such, we propose a total of four candidate scenarios that cover a broad range of potential levels of investment in unevaluated treatment indications, equal to 0%, 10%, 25%, and 50% of budget spending.
Secondary Analyses
Secondary analyses demonstrate the net health impact of CDF spending, in terms of QALYs gained, versus the marginal productivity of alternative services provided through the NHS. In this instance, the marginal productivity of NHS services is represented by the lower limit of the NICE cost-effectiveness threshold, equal to £20,000 per QALY gained. Additional analyses highlight the potential for QALY generation by treatment indication, to determine which services provide the greatest health gains in terms of mortality and morbidity among cancer patients, in addition to estimating overall investment and ability for health improvement in the following forms of cancer: As such, an "average cost per QALY" by cancer type was estimated for each of the 14 different forms of cancer for which treatments were available through the CDF. In doing so, the total expenditure on all drugs within a specific etiology was divided by the total number of QALYs generated as a result. This provided an estimate of the current average cost per QALY within each of the 14 forms of cancer reimbursed under the CDF, and providing an indication as to where these funds are presently best spent.
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Results
Health Technology Assessment: Evaluated versus Unevaluated
In total, 74 treatment indications were provided through the CDF during the study period of April 2013 to March 2014. Of these, 31 were yet to issue HTA reports estimating their clinical/costeffectiveness and budget impact, 6 resulting from terminated appraisals, 2 with guidance currently in development, and 23 with no guidance at all. In total, these treatment indications collectively accounted for more than one-third (38.3%) of CDF activity, corresponding to 7,386 of 19,282 funded treatment episodes during 2013-2014. Abiraterone for the treatment of metastatic castration-resistant prostate cancer accounted for more than 40% of this "unevaluated" utilization, with a total of 3023 treatment episodes approved, equal to 15.7% of total CDF activity and making this unevaluated treatment indication the most commonly approved within the CDF. Table 2 lists all evaluated CDF treatment indications, their indications approved during the study period, and costs per treatment episode and cost-effectiveness (ICER), in terms of cost per QALY gained, while Figure 1 demonstrates the respective utilization of CDF-funded treatments grouped by ICER. Those with ICERs of less than £50,000, £50,000 to £90,000, and more than £90,000 accounted for 26.1%, 41%, and 32.9% of CDF expenditure, respectively, reaching a maximum of £223,627 per QALY in the case of cetuximab for the second-or third-line treatment of metastatic colorectal cancer.
CDF: Willingness to Pay
CDF: Ability to Pay
Applying the league-table approach to our "base-case" scenario in which only evaluated treatment indications are subject to reimbursement, demand for all treatment indications, from the least to the most cost-effective, could be met with a surplus budget of £10.3 million remaining. This suggests that in the base case it is not possible to determine an appropriate threshold using the league-table approach because ability to pay is at least as great as willingness to pay. As such, the benchmark interventions approach suggests that the appropriate threshold should be equal to the ICER of the least cost-effective treatment indication subject to reimbursement at that time, corresponding to £223,627.
Under scenarios 1, 2, and 3 with 10% (£28 million), 25% (£70 million), and 50% (£140 million) of the £280 million annual CDF budget formally ring fenced for the provision of unevaluated drugs, the league-table approach estimates appropriate costeffectiveness thresholds, and corresponding CDF ability to pay up to maximum ICERs of £149,000, £111,400, and £68,600 per 
CDF, Cancer Drugs Fund; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year. continued on next page
QALY, respectively. Under these scenarios, satisfying demand for treatment indications with ICERs beyond these points would necessitate overspending of £17.6 million, £73.7 million, and £129.7 million, respectively, alternatively introducing horizontal inequity where those with equal clinical need cannot receive equal access to treatment funding.
Comparison of CDF and NHS QALY Generation
In the base-case scenario, whereby clinical demand for all evaluated treatment indications is met, these treatments would generate approximately 4677 QALYs, at a cost of £269.7 million. If instead this funding were used for day-to-day NHS activity, applying £20,000 per QALY as an estimate of NHS marginal productivity, the estimated number of QALYs gained would equal 13,485, resulting in the displacement of approximately 8,808 QALYs over the study period, with a corresponding net present value of £176.2 million. Table 3 highlights total QALY generation by treatment indication, with 8.3 and 4.9 potential NHS QALYs forgone for every 1 CDF QALY generated through the use of trastuzumab emtansine and cetuximab (all indication average), respectively. Figure 2 highlights the CDF's ability to generate QALYs, and an estimate of "average cost per QALY gained," in each of the 14 therapeutic areas covered by the CDF during the study period. Those treated for leukemia, colorectal, and breast cancer accrued a total of 1259, 831, and 685 QALYs, respectively, whereas those with melanoma (43 QALYs), head and neck (38.2 QALYs), and gastrointestinal (26.7 QALYs) cancers generated considerably less QALYs. Furthermore, despite total annual costs for the treatment of ovarian cancers and leukemia varying by just 10% (£35.5 million vs. £31.6 million), using CDF funds for the latter generated some 1,017 additional QALYs per year, resulting in average ICERs of £146,738 and £25,094 per QALY, respectively, and highlighting the significant differences in marginal benefits and marginal costs between therapeutic areas. ALK, anaplastic lymphoma kinase; CDF, Cancer Drugs Fund; ERG, evidence review group; FAD, final appraisal determination; HTA, health technology assessment; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; NICE, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence; QALY, qualityadjusted life-year; TA, technology appraisal. * Data contained within NICE HTAs incomplete. Treatment cost data sourced from the literature, converted to pounds sterling, and inflated to represent their net present value as appropriate. † NICE Guidance unclear as to the most plausible estimate of ICER, suggesting that it lies somewhere between the manufacturers' base case of £74,500 and the ERG case of £149,000. £111,500 represents the midpoint between the two. 2 0 1 6 ) 5 6 
QALY Generation and "Average Cost per QALY" by Therapeutic Area
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 9 (
7 -5 7 6
Discussion
Implications of Study Findings
The results of this study suggest that the existence of the CDF results in considerable opportunity costs within NHS England, which can be measured in terms of forgone population health. Making reference to the NICE cost-effectiveness threshold of £20,000 per QALY, we estimate a net loss of 8,808 QALYs per annum, with the CDF generating 4,677 QALYs compared with a potential 13,485 if the same funds were used as part of routine NHS commissioning. With respect to the evaluative requirements of CDF drugs, of the 74 treatment indications reimbursed through the CDF during the study period, just 58% (43) were subject to evaluation by NICE, with the remaining 42% of largely unknown clinical and cost-effectiveness and budget impact. These treatment indications accounted for more than a third (38.3%) of CDF activity in 2013-2014, corresponding to 7,386 of 19,282 treatment episodes.
Our base-case analysis, without the formal ring fencing of funds for the provision of unevaluated drugs, demonstrated a CDF willingness-to-pay value of £223,627 per QALY gained, suggesting a willingness-to-pay value for access to cancer treatments some 11 times greater than that applied by NICE as part of routine NHS commissioning. Furthermore, our results indicate that 26%, 41%, and 33% of the CDF budget was dedicated to treatments with ICERs of less than £50,000, £50,000 to £90,000, and more than £90,000 per QALY, respectively. As such, with the average CDF treatment exhibiting an ICER of £75,086 per QALY, the efficiency of the CDF, in terms of ability to generate QALYs, appears considerably lower than that of the wider NHS, seemingly willing to accept a much lower level of clinical benefit for every pound spent, despite having a much lower budget to begin with.
Our study findings also suggest that the CDF is currently funding interventions with ICERs considerably above our imputed thresholds, based on 10%, 25%, and 50% of the annual CDF budget being ring fenced to provide drugs of largely unknown cost-effectiveness. This is despite the fact that funding these interventions will necessitate that others with lower associated ICERs and greater gains in survival and quality of life per pound spent are subsequently not funded. This not only represents poor resource allocation in terms of maximizing population health subject to a budget constraint but also raises concerns regarding horizontal equity, widely considered a fundamental founding principle of the NHS. In fact, by formalizing the dual function of the CDF and ring fencing 10%, 25%, or 50% of its budget for the reimbursement of unevaluated drugs, the league-table approach derived an absolute maximum ability-topay value of £149,000, £111,400, and £68,600 per QALY, respectively, while still preserving equal access for equal need among all approved interventions. As such, in the absence of any clear rationing framework, drugs with ICERs beyond any given threshold can currently be funded only for a subset of patients with equal need before the budget is exhausted, compounding the potential inequities created by the fund's mode of operation, which requires individual applications rather than blanket funding for a given clinical indication or patient subpopulation.
Dealing with Unevaluated Treatment Indications
The considerable reduction in ability to pay for cancer QALYs as increasingly more of the CDF budget is diverted to funding unevaluated treatment indications is a clear signal of the implicit trade-off between offering an extended willingness to pay for cancer drugs and providing a means of reducing waiting times for those accessing "novel" cancer drugs. Our findings suggest that the CDF budget, at its current level, is sufficiently large to service demand for all treatment indications subject to prior health technology assessment, signifying that only through the funding of unevaluated treatments of largely unknown budget impact does the CDF then risk exhausting its budget and the need to seek additional funding.
This finding may be informative to considerations of how much of the fund ought to be allocated to reimbursing drugs of unknown cost-effectiveness, and how evaluated and unevaluated drugs may be traded off. As alluded to within this analysis, one potential solution is to decide in advance how much to dedicate to funding these unevaluated treatments, then only funding treatments within this group for which the entirety of patient demand can be met, that is, which treatments can be provided equitously. In doing so, and through the prospective collection of real-world evidence during treatment, it is possible that any treatments with ICERs below the chosen threshold for 
evaluated treatments may then be transferred to the "evaluated" group, thereby displacing the least cost-effective (marginal) interventions within this group, gradually improving the efficiency of the CDF.
We believe this point to be of great importance, with our results demonstrating that the possible QALY gains achievable through disinvesting from evaluated but highly cost-ineffective drugs could be substantial. Considering treatments individually, it was demonstrated that for every 1 CDF QALY generated through the use of Kadcyla, cetuximab (all indication average), and bevacizumab (all indication average), the NHS will forgo 8.3, 4.9, and 4.7 QALYs, respectively, clearly demonstrating the extent of the trade-off in terms of population health. Furthermore, if considering the impact of such extensive differences in costeffectiveness solely with respect to CDF efficiency, our findings suggested that the reimbursement of Kadcyla generates some 60% fewer QALYs per pound than the "average" CDF treatment indication, further highlighting the benefits that could be CML, chronic myeloid leukemia; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; NHS, National Health Service; NSCLC, non-small cell lung cancer; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.
achieved through the adoption of a more formally driven approach to disinvestment within the CDF. These findings may be interpreted as a quantification of the implicit premium for cancer QALYs that goes beyond that of the willingness to pay for noncancer QALYs by NICE. Expressed another way, the considerable variability exhibited in the ICERs attached to CDF-funded treatments may simply reflect an increased focus on the perceived wider benefits of extending treatment options within cancer. These may include addressing any unmet needs or perceived lack of innovation, aspects of disease severity or end-of-life considerations, or simply a shift in emphasis to improving access to health care interventions rather than a focus on health maximization itself, as not all health technologies possess the ability to generate improvements in health at the same price."
This was observed with respect to Figure 2 , whereby the average cost per QALY by the form of cancer being treated was shown to vary significantly, ranging from £10,990 and £25,094 in the cases of melanoma and leukemia, respectively, to £146,738 and £164,633 in the case of drugs for ovarian and head and neck cancers, respectively. As such, our results suggested that although spending on the treatment of ovarian cancers and leukemia was almost identical during the study period (£35.5 million vs. £31.6 million), the latter generated some 1017 additional QALYs per year, highlighting the extent of the variability in marginal costs and benefits exhibited between CDF treatments. We believe this to be an important consideration when deciding on the future provision of CDF treatment indications, particularly if there exists any unsatisfied demand for the most cost-effective treatments currently made available through the CDF.
Care Costs versus Drug Costs
Because the CDF funds only cancer drugs and not the accompanying costs of complementary health care in order to provide these drugs, including chemotherapy, nursing time, and complementary services, it is unclear what effect this has on program budgeting and commissioning within the NHS. Under the current operating model of the CDF, it is unlikely that these activities can be easily anticipated by administering health care providers. Hence, it is possible that formalizing a clear resource allocation protocol, as proposed in this study, may provide positive externalities by facilitating better planning of resource use outside of the fund, including any care costs relating to CDF treatments that are borne elsewhere in the NHS. It is unclear whether future economic evaluations undertaken by the fund should be restricted solely to cancer drug acquisition costs, or include NHS-wide costs including the costs of administering these treatments. Future research may wish to determine the relative contribution of drug acquisition costs to the costs of overall treatment episodes, to increase the internal validity of any cost-effectiveness ranking.
Strengths and Limitations
Strengths of the study include the quality of data sources used and the novel nature of the results obtained. The use of historical CDF utilization data leaves little room for error in terms of the real-world demand for specific cancer drugs, whereas NICE HTA and ERG reports provide rigorously considered estimates of the ICERs attached to these drugs. Moreover, no previous study has provided a means of improving resource allocation within the CDF and thereby minimizing the opportunity costs that result from the ring fencing of these funds in the first place.
An acknowledged limitation of this research is the existence of any patient access scheme pricing, risk sharing, or other discounts received by the CDF to the prices reported in health technology appraisals, on which no data were publicly available. Unlike NICE the CDF has no obligation to disclose the prices paid for drugs to the public, and as such, the ranking of these drugs by costeffectiveness, their budget impact, and the respective placements of these drugs in the league table may differ from those reported in this analysis. However, given that this information is available within the CDF, this limitation would not apply were the fund to adopt such a framework. Second, again because of paucity of data, the analyses used point estimates of parameters including ICERs and treatment costs with no explicit consideration of uncertainty around these parameter estimates using sensitivity analyses. As such, it is unclear whether the results obtained are robust to changes in model inputs, and whether recommendations for specific treatment indications can be put into action without seeking further information not available in the public domain.
Conclusions
Rationing, or prioritization, is clearly inevitable in a health care system with a fixed budget. The combination of scarce resources and near infinite demand implies that unmet medical need will persist. We have shown that the existence of the CDF imposes considerable opportunity costs in terms of forgone QALYs, and appears to be at odds with the principle of horizontal equity. Yet whether justifiable, rational, or otherwise, cancer is and is likely to continue to be afforded special consideration ahead of other therapeutic areas. We have demonstrated that the opportunity costs of ring fencing these funds can be reduced through the adoption of a formal QALY maximization mechanism. We therefore recommend that moving forward, the CDF adopts such a mechanism to make best use of this ring-fenced budget, promote horizontal equity, and maximize the potential health benefits to patients in need of high-quality cancer treatments.
